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| 인구 6만명 소도시 … 운용자산 규모 1000억 달러 넘어 |
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그리니치 시내 전경.
은퇴한 백인 부자들이 조용히 노후를 즐기는 부촌으로 유명한 미국 동부 코네티컷주. 남쪽 해안을 따라가다 보면 인구 6만명의 시골 도시를 만날 수 있다. 바로 이곳이 전 세계 ‘헤지펀드의 메카’인 그리니치다. 한적한 시골 분위기에 걸맞지 않게 건물 주차장마다 길게 늘어선 최고급 승용차들이 이 명성을 실감케 한다.
이곳에서 운용되는 헤지펀드의 자산은 1000억 달러를 넘어서는 것으로 추정된다. 전 세계 헤지펀드 운용자산의 10분의 1가량이 몰려 있는 셈이다. 전 세계 헤지펀드 가운데 약 4분의 3이 미국에 있는데, 그중에서도 헤지펀드가 가장 많이 몰린 곳이 그리니치와 뉴욕이다. 우리나라 주식시장에서도 활동 중인 애머랜스 투자자문(Amaranth Advisors LLC), 웩스포드캐피털(Wexford Capital LLC) 등도 그리니치에 거점을 두고 있다.
그리니치가 헤지펀드의 중심지로 떠오르기 시작한 것은 10여 년 전. 퇴직한 펀드매니저들이 자택 근처에 사무실을 열고 헤지펀드를 만들면서부터다. 지금도 매일같이 밀려드는 헤지펀드들 덕에 그리니치 상업지구의 공실률은 5% 이하를 유지한다. 쓸 만한 건물은 모두 꽉 들어찬 상태다. 이곳에 새로 사무실을 얻으려는 헤지펀드들은 수개월씩 기다려야 한다. 사무실 임대료도 뉴욕 맨해튼 수준에 버금갈 정도다.
이처럼 헤지펀드가 집중적으로 모인 곳이지만, 길거리에서 헤지펀드 매니저들을 만나기는 쉽지 않다. 잇따라 일어나는 헤지펀드 관련 사고를 의식해 외부 활동을 자제하기 때문이다. 한 현지인은 “신문을 보면 이곳에서만 하루 걸러 1건씩 헤지펀드 관련 사고가 터진다”고 전했다.
세계금융의 중심지인 뉴욕 맨해튼의 미드타운에도 최근 몇 년 사이 헤지펀드가 우후죽순처럼 생겨났다. 동시에 이들 가운데 상당수는 1년을 채 버티지 못하고 사라진다. 맨해튼에서 만난 한 금융회사 관계자는 “하루에도 수십 개씩 헤지펀드가 생겨나고, 또 흔적도 없이 사라진다”고 전했다.
헤지펀드 매니저들은 스스로를 ‘에비에이터’라고 부른다. 비행조종사라는 뜻의 에비에이터는 억만장자 하워드 휴즈의 일대기를 그린 영화 제목이기도 하다. ‘로켓 사이언스’로 불리는 금융공학을 무기로 삼기 때문이기도 하지만, 하워드 휴즈처럼 꿈과 야망을 위해 모든 것을 내던지는 자신들의 모습을 빗댄 표현이기도 하다.
뉴욕 맨해튼 시내의 한 헤지펀드 관계자는 “주중에는 잠을 못 자는 경우가 많을 정도로 힘들다”며 고단함을 털어놓았다. 아시아 유럽 등 해외시장에 투자하는 헤지펀드 매니저들에게는 업무시간이 따로 없기 때문이다.
급격히 불어난 시장 규모 못지않게 날로 치열해지는 경쟁 탓에 많은 헤지펀드가 위험한 곡예비행을 펼치고 있다. 익명을 요구한 한 헤지펀드 관계자는 “수익률에 눈이 멀어 망할 게 뻔한 회사의 부실채권이나 전환사채를 사들이는 헤지펀드도 있다”며 “위험관리가 소홀한 헤지펀드에 돈을 맡겼다가는 낭패를 볼 수도 있다”고 했다. |
| 말레이시아 정부 집중 육성 등록된 역외금융회사 3000개 ‘훌쩍’ |
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라부안 역외금융센터 건물.
말레이시아의 수도 쿠알라룸푸르에서 국내선 항공기를 타고 동쪽으로 2시간 정도 가면 보르네오 섬 북쪽에 숲으로 뒤덮인 섬 하나가 나온다. 상공에서 보기엔 밀림과 띄엄띄엄 떨어진 농가뿐인 이 조그만 섬이 ‘역외 헤지펀드의 천국’ 라부안이다.
아시아 최대 조세회피처인 이곳에서 방문객을 가장 먼저 맞이하는 것은 공항 복도에 걸린 역외금융센터(IOFC) 안내판이다. 공항에서 택시를 잡아타고 섬 남동쪽으로 가면 역외금융센터 건물을 손쉽게 찾을 수 있다. 라부안 섬 최대 건물로, 주말에는 섬 주민의 휴식 공간으로 쓰이는 이 센터가 바로 아시아 조세회피 자금에는 등기소 같은 곳이다.
라부안은 술 담배 초콜릿에 세금을 면제한다는 것 외에는 보통 휴양지와 다를 바 없는 평화로운 섬이다. 그런 섬이 아시아 역외 헤지펀드의 중심지가 된 것은 1990년 말레이시아 정부가 이곳에 역외금융센터를 세운 뒤부터다. 이때부터 말레이시아 정부는 라부안을 역외금융 허브로 집중 육성하기 시작했다.
라부안 역외금융센터를 관리하는 라부안 역외금융서비스당국(LOFSA)은 라부안을 이슬람권 최대 금융 중심지로 만든다는 목표를 가지고 있다. 현재 라부안에 등록된 역외금융회사 수는 3000개를 훌쩍 넘어선다.
역외 자금이 라부안 역외금융센터로 몰리는 이유는 세금 때문이다. 이곳에 서류상 회사(페이퍼컴퍼니)를 등록해두면 말레이시아와 이중과세방지협정을 맺은 나라에 투자할 경우 증권을 보유하면서 얻는 배당 등의 소득에 대해 세금을 한 푼도 물지 않는다. 거래세는 1년에 최대 5260달러만 내면 된다.
다만 우리나라에 투자할 때는 예외다. 지난해 6월까지는 라부안에 페이퍼컴퍼니를 등록해두고 우리나라에 투자하면 소득세를 한 푼도 내지 않았다. 미국계 사모투자회사(PEF) 뉴브리지캐피털이 제일은행을 인수한 뒤 되팔면서 1조원 넘는 차익을 올리고도 세금을 물지 않은 게 대표적인 사례였다.
하지만 지난해 7월 정부가 조세회피처 펀드에 대해 배당, 이자, 주식양도 등을 통한 소득에 세금을 원천징수하면서 사정이 달라졌다. 3년 내에 해당 지역의 ‘실질 귀속자’임을 입증하면 세금을 돌려받을 수 있지만, 라부안에 등록한 펀드들은 대부분 페이퍼컴퍼니여서 ‘실질 귀속자’로 인정받기 힘들다. |
원문 : 이데일리
<1부> 헤지펀드에 대한 이해와 오해
롱숏, 이벤트, 글로벌매크로 전략 등 다양
시대별로 스타일 달라져
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| [이데일리 권소현기자] 1949년 알프레드 존스의 롱숏 전략으로 출발한 헤지펀드는 시간이 갈수록 분화, 다양해졌다.
큰 범주에서 차익거래, 상대가치, 이벤트, 방향성 등 몇 가지로 나눌 수 있고 시대에 따라 유행을 타기도 했다.
그러나 세부적인 전략은 대부분 베일에 가려져 있다. 투자전략이 무기인 헤지펀드들이 어디에 어떻게 투자했는지 미주알고주알 밝힐리 만무하고, 자유자재로 전략을 바꿀 수 있기 때문에 전략을 밝혀도 큰 의미를 부여하기 어렵다.
◇ 헤지펀드 투자스타일
기술적 분석을 통해 주식과 채권을 사거나 공매도하는 전략, 장기적인 전망을 기초로 투자하는 전략, 시장의 비효율성을 활용한 차익거래 전략 등이 기본적이다.
큰 틀은 비슷하지만 인덱스 별로 각기 다른 체계를 갖고 있다. MSCI 헤지 종합지수는 5개의 큰 분류 하에 18개의 세부 전략으로 구성돼 있고, 크레디스위스/트레몬트 인덱스는 10개 전략으로 나눠져 있다.
노근환 한국투자증권 애널리스트는 “인덱스별로 분류체계는 다소 상이하지만 인덱스 내에서 높은 비중을 차지하는 전략들은 대체적으로 비슷하다”고 말했다.
이중 비교적 널리 알려진 전략은 롱숏 전략(Long/Short)으로 최초의 헤지펀드 전략이기도 하다. 올라갈 것으로 예상되는 주식을 사고 하락할 것 같은 주식을 공매도하는 방법이다.
이벤트 전략(Event Driven)은 기업간 인수합병이나 분사, 증자, 기업구조 재편 등 이벤트로 인한 가격변동 과정에서 수익을 창출할 수 있는 기회를 포착하는 전략이다.
상대가치 전략(Relative Value)은 채권, 파생상품 등에서 가격이 왜곡됐을 경우 싼 것을 사고 비싼 것을 파는 식이고 주식시장 중립형은 롱숏을 이용해 시장의 등락과 상관 없이 일정한 수익을 올리는 것이다.
글로벌 매크로 전략(Global Macro)은 거시경제의 중장기 전망을 근거로 거시변수들의 추세적 변동을 예측해 전세계의 주식, 채권, 통화, 상품 등에서 롱이나 숏 포지션을 취하는 것을 말한다.
부실증권(Distressed Securities) 전략은 부실화된 기업의 주식이나 채권에 투자해 회복시 시세차익을 겨냥하는 것이다.
◇ 시대별로 어떤 스타일이 유행했나
1990년대만 해도 헤지펀드 가운데 70% 이상이 글로벌 매크로 전략을 사용했다. 그러나 99년 이후 IT버블 붕괴를 겪으면서 전세계 경제가 휘청하자 거시적인 전망을 기초로 한 이 전략의 인기는 시들해졌다.
대신 펀더멘털 분석에 기초한 롱숏 전략이 뜨기 시작했다. 아울러 저금리 기조로 글로벌 유동성이 넘쳐나면서 인수합병(M&A)이 활발해지자 이같은 이벤트를 활용해 수익을 창출하는 이벤트 전략도 부상했다.
크레디스위스/트레몬트 헤지 인덱스에 따르면 지난 6월 기준 롱숏 주식 전략이 전체 헤지펀드에서 26.7%를 차지, 가장 큰 비중을 보였고 이벤트 전략이 24.5%로 뒤를 이었다.
반면 90년대 급성장하면서 94년초 65.1%를 차지했었던 글로벌 매크로 전략은 올해 6월 14%로 쪼그라들었다.
최근 금융시장 불안으로 공매도 전용(Dedicated Short Bias) 전략이나 파생상품(Managed Futures) 전략이 높은 수익률을 보이면서 점차 기반을 확대하고 있다.
아울러 헤지펀드에 고루 투자한 `펀드 오브 헤지펀드`나 여러 전략으로 구성된 `멀티 전략`에 대한 투자가 증가한 것도 특징이다.
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Posted 2 months, 2 weeks ago. Add a comment
원문 : 이데일리
<1부> 헤지펀드에 대한 이해와 오해
1949년 첫 등장..80년대 퀀텀펀드 나오면서 급성장
최근 글로벌 금융위기로 휘청
[이데일리 권소현기자] 헤지펀드가 첫 선을 보인 것은 지금으로부터 60년 전이다. 1949년 알프레드 윈슬로우 존스가 롱/숏 펀드를 출시한 것이 헤지펀드의 시초다.
이후 헤지펀드는 드라마틱한 속도로 성장해왔다. 소수를 위한 은밀한 금융상품으로 음지에 있었던 헤지펀드는 2000년 세계적인 저금리 기조와 풍부한 유동성을 타고 전통 금융상품의 대안투자로 떠오르면서 글로벌 금융시장에서의 존재감을 키워갔다.
물론 그 과정에서 몇번의 금융위기를 겪으면서 구조조정을 거치기도 했고, 변화에 맞게 새로운 전략을 끊임 없이 고안해내면서 스스로 진화해 왔다. 그러나 2008년 유례없는 금융위기를 맞아 또 다른 고비에 직면했다.
◇ 존스부터 LTCM까지
1923년 하버드 대학을 졸업하고 증기선 선원, 독일 외교관, 종군기자 등 화려한 경험을 쌓은 알프레드 존스는 1949년 종잣돈 10만달러를 끌어모아 주식에 투자하는 펀드를 설립했다. 자산을 운용하는데 있어서 최대한 유연성과 자율성을 확보하기 위해 존스는 합자회사 형태로 시작했다. 그래야 증권거래위원회(SEC)의 규제를 피할 수 있었기 때문.
저평가된 주식을 사고, 고평가된 주식을 빌려서 매도하는 전략을 추구했다. 빌린 주식을 매도하면서 챙긴 자금으로 다시 주식을 매수해 레버리지도 추가했다. 이것이 세계 최초의 헤지펀드다. 이같은 방식으로 적지만 꾸준한 수익을 냈다.
그러나 1960년대 증시가 강세를 보이면서 공매도를 이용한 헤지펀드 수익률은 형편없이 떨어졌고, 순수히 주식을 사들이는 전략이 유행하기 시작했다. 그러나 1960년대 후반부터 증시가 고꾸라지기 시작했고 브레튼우즈 체제 붕괴, 1차 오일쇼크 등을 겪으면서 증시가 출렁이자 헤지펀드는 상당한 손실을 냈다. 잇단 환매요청에 문 닫는 헤지펀드들이 줄줄이 나왔다.
이후 헤지펀드는 잠잠하다가 1980년대 들어 다시 부각되기 시작했다. 놀라울만한 수익률을 올린 전설적인 헤지펀드 매니저들이 출현한 덕이다. 이들은 바로 1986년 타이거펀드를 운용한 줄리안 로버트슨과 1992년 퀀텀펀드를 이끈 조지 소로스다.
타이거펀드는 첫 6년동안 비용과 보수를 제외하고 연간 43%의 수익을 투자자들에게 안겨줬다. 같은 기간 S&P500지수가 18.7% 오른 것에 비해 상당한 성과였다.
이후 조지 소로스가 1992년 영국 파운드화를 공격해 영란은행의 외환보유고를 한달만에 바닥내고 10억달러를 벌어들이면서 헤지펀드에 대한 관심은 더욱 뜨거워졌다.
물론 이같은 펀드들은 금융시장을 교란시킨 주범이라는 눈총을 받기도 했지만 투자자들에게는 더할나위 없이 고마운 펀드였다. 거액의 자산가들은 앞다퉈 돈을 싸들고 헤지펀드를 찾아오기 시작했다.
그러다 헤지펀드 업계에 엄청난 시련이 닥쳤다. 롱텀캐피탈매니지먼트(LTCM)가 붕괴된 것이다. 과도한 레버리지를 일으켜 차익거래 전략을 구사했지만 러시아의 모라토리엄 선언과 아시아 외환위기로 시장은 예상과는 반대로 흘렀고 LTCM은 1200억달러의 손실을 입은채 파산했다.
이는 전세계 금융시장을 위협했으며 규제의 필요성을 끌어낸 사건이기도 했다. 헤지펀드 업계에는 미래가 사라진 듯 했다.
◇ 21세기 헤지펀드 전성시대
그러나 2000년대 들어 헤지펀드는 다시 각광을 받기 시작했다. IT버블로 전세계 증시가 부진을 면치 못한 가운데 금리가 낮아지자 상대적으로 수익률이 양호한 헤지펀드로 자금이 몰린 것.
이에 따라 2000년대 들어 헤지펀드는 괄목할만한 성장세를 보였다. 워낙 헤지펀드 정보가 제한적이어서 조사기관마다 수치에 다소 차이가 있지만 21세기 들어 연평균 20% 이상의 성장률을 보인 것으로 파악되고 있다.
런던의 싱크탱크인 국제금융센터(IFSL)는 작년 전세계 헤지펀드 자산규모가 2조3000억달러(펀드 오브 헤지펀드 포함)에 달하며 펀드수는 1만1000개인 것으로 파악하고 있다. 2000년부터 작년까지 연평균 27.8%씩 성장했으며 펀드수도 2000년 대비 2.3배 증가한 것이다.
헤지펀드 리서치 회사인 HFR에 따르면 1992년 960억달러였던 헤지펀드 자산규모는 올해 2분기 기준 1조9300억달러로 늘었다. 15년반만에 20배 가량 급증한 것으로 연평균 증가율은 23%에 이른다.
전문가들은 통계에 잡히지 않는 헤지펀드까지 고려하면 실제 규모는 훨씬 클 것으로 추정하고 있다.
그러나 이처럼 고속성장을 해온 헤지펀드도 최근 금융위기에 휘청이고 있다. 서브프라임 모기지발 신용위기가 터진 이후 자금유입은 주춤해졌고 고름이 본격 터지기 시작한 3분기부터는 썰물 빠지듯 빠져나가고 있다.
HFR이 집계한 바에 따르면 3분기 헤지펀드 총자산은 2100억달러 감소해 사상 최대폭으로 줄었다. 유입된 자금은 1000억달러에 불과한 반면 유출된 자금은 3100억달러에 달했다. 이에 따라 2분기말까지만 해도 1조9300억달러였던 헤지펀드 총 자산은 9월말 1조7200억달러로 급감했다.
HRF의 헤지펀드 인덱스는 3분기에만 8.9% 하락했고 올초부터 계산해보면 10% 이상 빠진 것이다.
◇ 환매요청 빗발..헤지펀드 먹구름
이에 따라 장미빛 일색이었던 헤지펀드 업계 전망에도 먹구름이 잔뜩 끼었다.
지난 2005년 밴 헤지펀드 어드바이저스는 2013년까지 헤지펀드 자산규모가 4조달러로 늘어날 것이며 2015년에는 6조달러로 급증할 것으로 전망했다. 맥킨지글로벌 연구소 역시 2012년 3조5000억달러에 달할 것이며 만약 헤지펀드 수익률이 좋을 경우 4조6000억달러까지도 가능할 것으로 내다봤다.
그러나 서브프라임 모기지 부실로 시작된 미국의 금융위기가 전세계로 급속하게 퍼져가면서 헤지펀드들이 줄도산할 것이라는 경고가 잇따라 나오고 있다.
계속 늘어만 가던 헤지펀드 자산 규모는 감소하기 시작했고 헤지펀드들은 고객들의 자금상환 요청이 빗발치자 미리 보유자산을 매각, 속속 현금화하고 있다. 메릴린치에 따르면 9월 헤지펀드들의 현금보유 규모는 1840억 달러로 사상최고치를 기록했다. 펀드자산의 10%에 달하는 규모다.
켄 하인즈 HFR 사장은 “10월에도 헤지펀드 자금유출이 이어지면서 올해가 수익률과 자산규모 모두에서 헤지펀드 업계에는 사상 최악의 해가 될 것”이라고 말했다.
금융분야 취업정보업체인 옵션즈그룹은 15만명으로 추산되는 전세계 헤지펀드 일자리중 올해 1만개가 사라질 것으로 전망하기도 했다. 한때 높은 몸값을 자랑했던 헤지펀드 매니저들도 이번 금융위기에 백수 신세로 전락할 위기에 처한 셈이다.
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원문 : 이데일리
<1부> 헤지펀드에 대한 이해와 오해
시장 방향성과 상관없이 절대 수익률 추구
금융위기 때마다 주범으로 지목돼
[이데일리 권소현기자] 글로벌 금융위기가 진정되지 않고 있는 가운데 국제 금융시장에서 막강한 위력을 발휘해 온 헤지펀드가 내년 상반기부터 국내에 단계적으로 도입된다. 금융위원회는 글로벌 위기가 고조되면서 헤지펀드 허용시점을 연기해야 한다는 지적에 대해 ‘자통법 시행은 예정대로 추진될 것’이라는 기존 입장을 강조하고 있다. 이데일리는 헤지펀드의 국내 상륙에 앞서 헤지펀드에 대한 구체적인 정의를 시작으로, 헤지펀드가 어떻게 성장했는지, 금융시장에는 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지, 문제점과 리스크 요인은 무엇인지 등을 총 3부의 기획시리즈로 짚어본다. [편집자]
`자본주의의 악마` `아시아인들의 고혈을 빨아먹는 자` `돈만 아는 협잡꾼`
헤지펀드의 대부로 불리는 조지 소로스에 대해 말레이시아의 마하티르 총리가 퍼부은 독설이다.
90년대부터 본격적으로 금융시장에서 존재감을 쌓기 시작한 헤지펀드는 이후 놀라운 속도로 성장했지만, 인식은 그다지 좋지 않다. 종종 금융시장을 교란시키는 핫머니로 규정되는가 하면 `하이 리스크-하이 리턴`을 추구하는 금융시장의 하이에나쯤으로 여겨졌다.
실제 롱텀캐피탈(LTCM)의 붕괴, 1992년 파운드화의 폭락과 영국 중앙은행의 굴복, 아시아 통화위기 등 글로벌 금융시장의 주요 사건들에 헤지펀드가 배경으로 지목되면서 투기꾼의 이미지를 벗어나지 못하고 있다.
현재 대공황 이후 최악이라는 금융위기가 발생하자 헤지펀드는 또다시 주범으로 지목되고 있다. 과연 헤지펀드가 뭐길래 금융위기때마다 따가운 눈총을 받는 것일까.
◇ 오지랖 넓고 배짱 좋은 펀드
사실 헤지펀드에 대한 명확한 정의는 없다. 헤지펀드 산업이 가장 발달한 미국에서 감독대상에 넣을 수 없는 이유 중 하나도 증권거래법이나 규정에 헤지펀드에 대한 정의가 없기 때문이다.
사전적인 의미로 `헤지(hedge)`는 `울타리를 치다, 손해를 막다`를 뜻한다. 금융기관마다, 학자마다 헤지펀드에 대한 정의를 조금씩 다르게 내리고 있지만 공통적인 것은 시장 상황과 관계없이 특정 목표수익률을 올리는 것을 목표로 한다는 점이다. 그렇게 보면 사전적 의미에 어느정도 부합한다.
유레카헤지는 “기초자산에 대해 명백하게 절대 수익률을 추구하는 것”으로 정의했다.
골드만삭스 역시 “수익과 위험에 대한 허용범위가 넓고 다양한 투자전략을 구사한다”며 “시장 방향성과는 상관 없이 수익을 얻기 위해 투자나 위험관리 기법을 사용하는 것”이라고 설명해 절대 수익률을 강조했다.
그러나 약간은 삐딱한 시선으로 바라보는 경우도 있다. 인베스토피디아닷컴은 헤지펀드를 “투기적인 기회를 활용해 공격적으로 운영하는 포트폴리오”라고 설명했고 머니센트럴인베스터는 “큰 위험을 감수하면서 높은 수익률을 추구하는 위험한 투자펀드”로 정의했다.
실제로 과연 절대 수익률이 가능한가에 대한 회의론도 많다. 토머스 스니와이스 메사추세츠대 교수는 “헤지펀드가 절대적인 수익을 보장해주는 것이 아니라는 사실이 이미 작년에 드러났다”며 “다만 경제상황에 맞는 수익을 제공해줄 뿐”이라고 말했다.
◇ 남들 못하는 전략 마음껏 구사
헤지펀드를 한마디로 정의하기 보다는 뮤추얼펀드나 사모펀드와 어떤 점에서 다른지를 보는 것이 헤지펀드를 이해하기에 훨씬 용이하다.
사실 뮤추얼펀드나 사모펀드에서는 허용되지 않는 것이 있는 반면 헤지펀드는 거의 제약없이 포트폴리오를 운영할 수 있다. 그렇기 때문에 앵글로 색슨 금융자본주의가 만들어낸 합법적 투기세력으로 간주되기도 한다.
대표적인 것이 바로 공매도(short sale)다. 공매도는 갖고 있지 않은 증권을 빌려서 매도한 다음 일정 기간 후에 시장에서 사서 되갚는 방법으로 주가가 하락할 때 수익을 낼 수 있는 방법이다.
뮤추얼펀드는 기본적으로 사는 것과 갖고 있는 것을 파는 것만 가능하기 때문에 공매도는 꿈도 꿀 수 없고, 사모펀드도 구사하기 쉽지 않다.
레버리지 역시 헤지펀드가 쓸 수 있는 차별화된 전략이다. 물론 사모펀드도 레버리지를 일으키기는 하지만 직접 차입이 대부분이다.
노근환 한국투자증권 애널리스트는 “최근 헤지펀드는 파생상품을 주요 차입수단으로 사용하고 있다”며 “2004년에는 글로벌 헤지펀드의 약 80%가 차입을 사용했고 1997년 이후 10년동안 헤지펀드의 연도별 레버리지 비율은 125~165% 수준이었다”고 말했다.
이밖에 아비트리지, 파생상품 투자, 스왑, 차익거래 등은 일부 뮤추얼펀드나 사모펀드도 가능하지만 헤지펀드의 경우 처음 제시한 전략을 고수할 필요가 없다는 점에서 또 차별화된다. 필요하다면 어떤 전략이라도 언제든지 차용할 수 있고, 이는 전적으로 펀드매니저에게 달려있다. 즉, `마음대로 하세요` 하고 돈을 맡기는 셈이다.
◇ 소수만을 위한 펀드
수익률이 절대적으로 펀드매니저에게 달려있는 만큼 헤지펀드에는 운용수수료 외에 성과수수료가 따로 있다. 운용에 필요한 비용 격인 운용보수(management fee)는 매년 1~3%에 불과하지만 매니저를 독려하기 위한 성과보수(performance fee)는 연간 실현된 수익의 20~35% 수준이다.
헤지펀드에 투자할 수 있는 주체도 제한적이다. 감독영역의 밖에 있기 때문에 소수의 특정 투자자들만 가능한 것. 소위 말해 거부들을 위한 그들만의 펀드인 셈이다. 그나마 헤지펀드의 최소 투자자금 기준이 낮아지면서 돈 좀 있는 개인투자자들의 투자도 가능해졌지만 그래도 최소 100만달러 이상은 갖고 있어야 한다.
다만, 헤지펀드가 대안투자 수단으로 떠오르면서 기관투자자들의 투자도 점차 늘어나고 있다. 헤네시그룹에 따르면 헤지펀드에서 연기금, 재단, 펀드 등을 포함해 기관투자자가 차지하는 비중은 1998년 46%에서 2007년 69%로 확대됐다.
그러나 불특정 다수가 아닌 특정 소수를 위한 펀드라는 점은 여전하다.
Posted 2 months, 2 weeks ago. Add a comment
By Richard Teitelbaum
Oct. 2 (Bloomberg) — Paolo Pellegrini has a nose for trouble. He saw it in rising housing prices in early 2006, when he cranked through decades of home price data and concluded the bubble was poised to burst. Pellegrini then helped engineer a massive bet against subprime mortgages that catapulted Paulson & Co. hedge funds to 2007 gains of as much as 590 percent — and firmwide profits of more than $3.5 billion.
Pellegrini, 52, pocketed tens of millions of dollars, allowing him to buy a couple of what he laughingly calls “entry- level supercars”: a silver Ferrari F430 with a base price of $168,000 and a black $109,000 Audi R8.
By April 2008, the Rome native smelled danger again. Nearly six months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and the bailout of American International Group Inc., he and his colleagues saw that the unfolding crisis would trigger U.S. government intervention: bank rescues, a stimulus plan and yawning deficits. That move would eventually undercut the dollar and U.S. stocks, unleashing market havoc, Pellegrini reasoned.
“The losses would be massive,” he says. “I knew the policy response would be commensurate.”
So, after wowing the investment world with Paulson & Co.’s subprime bet, Pellegrini is proving he is no one-hit wonder. While still working for Paulson, Pellegrini plowed a chunk of his personal winnings from the subprime bet into PSQR LLC, a private fund he created to protect his newfound riches. He began shorting exchange-traded funds that held financial stocks and, later, those that track the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index.
52% Gain
Then, at the end of 2008, as panicked investors stampeded into Treasuries, sending the yield on the 30-year bond down 184 basis points to 2.52 percent, Pellegrini covered his ETF shorts and began betting against U.S. Treasury futures with underlying maturities of 15 to 30 years. (A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.)
PSQR’s gain from April 15, 2008, through December was 52.4 percent, according to a fund document.
In December 2008, Pellegrini quit Paulson & Co. to start his own firm, PSQR Management LLC, taking his new fund’s white- hot record with him. His firm is staked with $100 million of his personal money. He plans to market it to outsiders in 2010.
“There will be a tremendous amount of interest in his new fund,” says Sol Waksman, founder of BarclayHedge Ltd., a Fairfield, Iowa-based firm that tracks and invests in hedge funds.
Pellegrini, a former member of Italy’s Radical Party with an engineering degree and a Harvard Business School MBA, is pursuing a global macro strategy, wagering on fundamental world economic trends.
Macro Fund
Like such storied macro investors as Julian Robertson and George Soros before him, he’s buying and shorting futures on government bonds, stock indexes and commodities like oil, as well as spot and forward foreign exchange contracts. At Paulson & Co., his brief was narrower; he co-managed two funds that bought credit protection on mortgage-backed bonds.
Since Pellegrini quit Paulson, his career has continued to sizzle. In January, Treasury prices plunged, with 30-year yields rising 92 basis points. PSQR’s short position generated a return of more than 65 percent that month, resulting in a year-to-date gain through July of 80 percent, according to fund documents.
Friends, as well as former colleagues and investors, say Pellegrini has a rare ability to apply rigorous analysis to specific financial markets, as he did with the subprime trade.
“Paolo is a deep thinker,” says William Michaelcheck, founder and chairman of Mariner Investment Group, a New York hedge fund firm where Pellegrini worked as an analyst in 2003 and 2004. “He was able to synthesize the situation into a hedge fund position. It’s the iconoclast’s ability to see things other people can’t see.”
Sober Prognosis
Today, Pellegrini’s economic outlook for the next 5 to 10 years is a sobering one. He says the U.S. economy will groan under the weight of budget deficits, increased regulation and household debt. Europe will perform only slightly better, and Asian economic growth will outstrip that of the developed world. “There are going to be huge shifts in wealth around the globe,” he says. “I want to invest in that.”
Pellegrini says the U.S. stock market is likely to generate negative returns when adjusted for inflation. And the U.S. dollar will flag as an unrestrained Federal Reserve dispenses more money.
“In the U.S., there is limited interest among those in power in the stability of the dollar,” he says.
Buying Oil Futures
Meanwhile, the price of scarce commodities such as oil will surge as global competition for them heats up, Pellegrini says. Accordingly, he expects U.S. Treasuries to fall in price in the long term, and he’s buying oil futures. In September, he owned Norwegian kroner and said he believed the Australian dollar would benefit from that resource-rich country’s geographic proximity to Asia.
When asked why he left Paulson & Co., Pellegrini takes a swig from a bottle of Volvic-brand spring water before answering that Paulson wasn’t interested in having him manage a macro fund. Beyond that, he says, he wanted to run his own show. “I’m an engineer,” he says. “As interested as I am in making investment decisions, I’m equally interested in designing and building an organization.”
Pellegrini, who is 6 feet 2 inches (188 centimeters) tall and weighs 190 pounds (86 kilograms), is a former jazz disc jockey with some unconventional views on how to fix global finance. He says, for instance, that the U.S. government put bank interests ahead of the common good in the bailout. He sees no reason why Americans should deposit their savings in private banks, since the government already guarantees those deposits.
Banks and Risk
The public’s cash, he says, can be held at accounts at the Federal Reserve. Loans can be made by nonbank lending institutions.
At a minimum, he says, there should be limits on bank profits — perhaps a 10 percent return on equity — to keep them from taking the kinds of risks that led to the housing bubble.
“You need a system where people won’t be incentivized to take risks,” Pellegrini says. “We don’t need bankers to take risks with our money.”
Pellegrini, who lives on the Upper West Side of Manhattan with his third wife, Henrietta, and her daughter, has a predilection for long, freewheeling conversations in which he tosses out incendiary snippets.
How has the U.S. central bank handled the crisis? “The Fed is printing money, as instructed by the financial services industry, so that they can stick all of us with the bill,” Pellegrini says, slouching in a conference room chair in his offices in the former IBM Building in Manhattan.
‘Zero Confidence’
And Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke? “I have zero confidence in what the Fed is doing.”
Pellegrini has offered some of his solutions to the financial crisis in opinion pieces on financial Web sites and blogs and in correspondence to legislators and senior officials in the Obama administration. Academics have taken note of Pellegrini’s ideas to drastically reduce the footprint of banks, known as “narrow banking” in academic argot. “They are very crisp and different and provocative,” says Kenneth Rogoff, an economics and public policy professor at Harvard University. “As an academic, I find that refreshing.”
The hedge fund manager’s charitable work is informed by his global outlook. Pellegrini is chairman of the U.S. board of the Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative. The group, founded by the former U.K. prime minister, provides political and business advice to African governments trying to reduce poverty.
Paolo Squared
Pellegrini says his fund’s name, PSQR, is a play on his own: Paolo or Pellegrini Squared. It’s also an anagram of SPQR, the initials of the ancient Roman Republic that stand for Senatus Populusque Romanus, or the Senate and the People of Rome. The four letters are still emblazoned on monuments and signs around the city, where Pellegrini was born and spent his first five years amid the cobblestoned alleys of the Trastevere district.
As PSQR’s assets grow, Pellegrini plans to assemble an investment team of 5 to 10 professionals. In May, he hired Alex Patelis, 38, chief international economist at Merrill Lynch & Co. in London, as PSQR’s chief economist. He joins, among others, two Ph.D.-toting senior analysts, JunTian Xu, 29, and Evan Borenstein, 28.
Pellegrini’s Paulson & Co. pedigree and PSQR track record will generate a lot of interest in his fund, Waksman says. Whether pension funds and other institutional investors will sign on is a question — though Pellegrini says his firm is self-sufficient and doesn’t need outside investors. Institutions are sometimes restricted in their ability to buy into smaller funds, says Daniel Celeghin, a director at Casey, Quirk & Associates LLC, a consulting firm in Darien, Connecticut.
‘I Love Your Story’
“It may be: ‘I love your story. I love your track record. Call me when you hit $600 million,’” he says.
Plus, Pellegrini earned his Paulson & Co. stripes with credit-default swaps. His tenure in the futures and currencies markets has been brief.
“Can his skills be transferred to new venues?” Waksman says. “It’s a fair question to ask.”
Institutional investors are particularly wary of macro funds. At the end of June, they represented just 18.8 percent of industry assets, according to Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.
“Macro often comes down to one or two people looking at all this analysis and making a call,” Celeghin says. “That’s a leap of faith for institutional investors.”
Macro in a Rut
In 2008, macro was one of the few categories in which hedge funds made money, with an average return of 4.83 percent, according to HFR. This year, macro managers are in a rut, returning just 2.68 percent through August, versus a 14.1 percent gain for the average fund.
That makes PSQR’s gain of 80 percent through July all the more impressive.
Pellegrini’s quantitative disposition traces back to his early years. The oldest of three children, Paolo Marco Pellegrini was born in 1957 to a household steeped in science. His father, Umberto, was a physics professor, and his mother, Anna, worked as a biology researcher.
The Pellegrinis moved north from Rome in 1962 when Umberto was appointed a professor at the University of Milan. There, Paolo took up classical piano and attended a liceo classico, studying Latin and ancient Greek. In Italy’s left-leaning north, dinner table conversations were often political. While a teenager, Paolo joined the Partito Radicale, a pacifist, anti- establishment party that advocated a ban on nuclear weapons, marijuana legalization and divorce rights.
Electrical Engineer
In 1975, he was admitted to the Politecnico di Milano, where he pursued a degree in electrical engineering. Many nights, he volunteered as a disc jockey at Milan’s Radio Radicale, spinning vinyl by bebop greats Dizzy Gillespie and Charlie Parker.
While a student, Pellegrini remembers circulating Radical Party petitions, including one calling for the strengthening of civil liberties. He stayed clear of demonstrations and student groups advocating violence. The 1970s and early 1980s were Italy’s Years of Lead, during which hundreds were killed or wounded in bombings and assassinations by both left- and right- wing extremists. In 1978, Red Brigade terrorists kidnapped and murdered former Christian Democratic Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Pellegrini focused on school and graduated cum laude in 1980.
Amid the strikes and demonstrations, the Italian economy was a shambles. “There were few opportunities in terms of a real career track,” Pellegrini says. He looked abroad. “Business school seemed like a good investment,” he says.
‘He Was Into Data’
Pellegrini was accepted to Harvard Business School in Boston, where professors stoked his interest in finance, economics and markets. Pellegrini’s field study adviser was Professor Andre Perold. “He was into data and patterns,” Perold says. “He was intrigued by the potential of math-based systems to trade stocks.”
Michaelcheck, a partner in the fixed-income division of Bear Stearns & Co., recalls recruiting the Italian youth as a summer associate in 1984. Pellegrini wrote pitch books on possible mergers and acquisitions for the firm’s clients. He shared an office with an M&A vice president named John Paulson, who was also a Harvard Business School graduate. He and Pellegrini soon became friends. “I found him to be extremely smart and capable,” Paulson, 53, says.
After Harvard, Pellegrini landed an associate’s position in corporate finance at Dillon Read & Co. It was 1985, and swashbuckling raiders had American business on the run. “I must have worked on a dozen deals,” Pellegrini says.
Insurance Expert
Dillon Read itself was bought by Travelers Corp. in 1986, and Pellegrini moved to Lazard Freres & Co. He specialized in insurance, and advised Munich-based Allianz AG on its 1990 acquisition of Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., a unit of Fund American Cos.
At Lazard, the pace was brutal. Pellegrini often worked 14- hour days, turning off the overhead lights in the office at night and blasting Mozart and Beethoven on his stereo. Yet Pellegrini was not a natural investment banker.
“It involved a lot of salesmanship,” he says. “That’s not my forte.”
In 1994, the fees he was generating dropped as he failed to rope in clients. The next year, Pellegrini says, Lazard fired him.
In 1996, Mariner’s Michaelcheck teamed up with Pellegrini to start a Bermuda-based firm called Select Reinsurance Ltd. After two years, the two, together with the firm’s board, decided an executive with more sales experience should replace Pellegrini.
“I was fired from that too,” he says.
No Traction
In 1999, he started a consulting firm named Global Risk Advisors LLC to counsel companies on reinsurance and other risk- related matters. The venture didn’t gain traction, and Pellegrini closed it in 2002. “Trying to reinvent myself was tricky,” he says.
Pellegrini compares these wilderness years to his treks as a youth in the Italian Alps. “There are times when you are hiking that you are really exhausted; you just put one foot in front of the other,” he says. “When you sit down, that’s when things just fall apart.”
Michaelcheck, back at Mariner, hired Pellegrini as an analyst in early 2003. At the time, a Mariner hedge fund was trading collateralized debt obligations — bundles of housing loans and other debt — and Pellegrini developed a fascination with CDOs, credit-default swaps and other derivatives. Michaelcheck assigned him to the fund.
Joining Paulson
Eager for a chance to run his own portfolio, Pellegrini, then 47, approached Paulson in the summer of 2004, asking for a job. “He said, ‘My analysts are more junior than you,’” Pellegrini recalls. “I said I didn’t care.”
Paulson had founded his firm in 1994 and built up two specialties. First was merger arbitrage, a strategy in which traders typically buy the stock of a possible takeover target and short that of the acquirer. The other was event arbitrage — wagering on corporate developments such as earnings surprises and stock buybacks. Still, he was also looking for a way to make money from what he saw as a growing credit bubble.
Paulson, who makes all investment decisions at the firm, orchestrated the research and assigned Pellegrini to look into housing — something he was familiar with from his time at Mariner. The surest bet against the housing market would be to buy credit-default swaps on subprime mortgage-backed securities. CDSs are insurance-like contracts used, in this case, to speculate on the default of a bond.
A Nervous Time
Pellegrini says the critical question was whether adjustable-rate mortgages would default as they reset at higher interest rates. Pellegrini believed they would, so in April 2005 Paulson & Co. began buying CDSs in small amounts for its existing funds.
The first year the trade was in effect was a nervous time. “From early 2005 to early 2006, it wasn’t clear the trade was going to work,” Pellegrini says. “People thought we were throwing money down the drain. We asked, Are we missing something?” Pellegrini says he would wake up in the night pondering the trade.
Before he increased his bet, Paulson wanted proof of a housing bubble, and he thought Pellegrini could produce it. “The mortgage market lends itself to deep quantitative analysis and modeling,” Paulson says. “Paolo excelled in this area.”
Finding the Bubble
Pellegrini and his colleagues zeroed in on numbers from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s home price index from 1975 to 2000. He drew a regression line through the data points that showed prices would have to fall 30 percent to 35 percent just to get back to the historical trend.
“After hearing a lot of arguments for and against the presence of the bubble, we had a simple and clear insight of our own to go by,” Pellegrini says.
He recalls that Paulson broke into a smile when he showed him the proof that houses were overpriced. “John doesn’t smile,” Pellegrini says. “It felt great.”
The next step was to determine the relationship between home prices and defaults. Pellegrini hired a New York firm called 1010Data Inc. to help him integrate two databases: One, compiled by Santa Ana, California-based First American Corp. and called LoanPerformance, tracked 6 million securitized subprime mortgages.
The other was based on an S&P/Case-Shiller home price index, sorted by postal code. The combined database showed that even if home prices merely flattened, defaults would surge. “There was a very strong relationship between mortgage losses and home prices,” Pellegrini says.
A Tough Sell
Paulson & Co. began drumming up money for two new funds — called Paulson Credit Opportunities and Credit Opportunities II — that would be dedicated to the subprime bet.
It was a tough sell. With the housing market still galloping upward, investors wanted details of both Paulson & Co.’s research and how the trade would work.
“I remember Paolo stopping by the office at 5 p.m. and staying to 9 p.m. explaining his research,” says Jack O’Connor, chief investment officer of AI International Corp., a family investment office. “We were impressed.” Over nine months, the firm raised $1.1 billion.
As home prices continued to rise, Paulson & Co. took advantage, paying as little as 1 cent for every dollar of credit protection. Former investors still marvel at the payoff. “It was technically a beautiful trade,” one money manager says. “The asymmetry was incredible.”
Market Collapse
The housing market peaked in mid-2006. “Once the year-over- year change in home price appreciation went negative in June 2006, we thought the collapse of the market was almost inevitable,” Paulson says.
For the last half of 2006, Credit Opportunities gained 19.4 percent, according to investors. In 2007, it showed a 590 percent return. In 2008, a year when the average hedge fund lost 19 percent, Credit Opportunities posted an 18.3 percent return. Firm assets rose to $30 billion at the end of 2008 from $7 billion two years earlier.
Pellegrini’s lucrative Paulson & Co. trade — he won’t discuss the fund returns or how much he made from them — was based on numbers. It was also based on an assessment of American society. Pellegrini says the credit bubble in the U.S. fed existing income inequalities.
“People were pretending they were earning a living, and they were not,” he says. “Banks lent them the money so they could live beyond their means.”
A Debtor Nation
There is a corollary to that imbalance in the global economy, Pellegrini says. Massive consumption has turned the U.S. into a debtor nation, which will ultimately lead to the devaluation of the dollar, a scenario PSQR is betting on through its long-term short position on Treasury futures and its long position on commodities.
The massive stimulus programs and the resulting deficits will only make matters worse, Pellegrini says.
It’s not a bright outlook for the U.S. Yet Pellegrini’s meteoric rise is proof that bad news can produce a lucrative bounty for those with the foresight to predict it.
To contact the reporter on this story: Richard Teitelbaum in New York at rteitelbaum1@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: October 2, 2009 00:02 EDT
October 22, 2008 (http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com)
The biggest issue for start up hedge funds (and also established hedge fund managers) is how to grow assets under management. Growing a hedge fund’s capital base is very important because increased AUM mean both increased management fees and performance fees (assuming the fund has positive performance returns). This article focuses on traditional avenues of raising capital for a hedge fund.
Raising Hedge Fund Capital – Friends and Family
Most hedge funds raise capital to start up through their friends and families. Often this can be a significant sum, other times it can be relatively small. I have seen some hedge funds start with as little as $500,000 and sometimes less. Often, after a hedge fund has a few months of performance (assuming again positive performance) these friends and family members will invest more money. Other friends and family members, who did not originally invest, may also decided to invest. Family members of investors may also be persuaded to invest in the hedge fund.
Generally investments from friends and family are completed fairly quickly and through less formal conversations than from other types of investors. However, the hedge fund manager must always make sure that the friends and family have the fund’s offering documents and have made the appropriate representations in the subscription documents.
After an initial investment from friends and family, it is important for a start up manager to focus on the trading as it is most important to have a good 6-12 month track record that you will be able to market to other potential investors.
Raising Hedge Fund Capital – High Net Worth Individual Investors
High net worth investors (generally qualified purchasers as well as some qualified clients and accredited investors) often invest in hedge funds. High net worth investors will usually have legal and investing teams which will vet the managers and the strategy. Usually there will at least be a minimum amount of due diligence requests on the manager and the fund. Managers can be introduced to high net worth investors through their own networks or through other channels such as hedge fund conferences, hedge fund databases or through other means.
Raising Hedge Fund Capital – Institutional Investors
Institutional investors will occasionally invest in hedge funds with a track record shorter than one year. Generally in these cases the hedge fund sticks out to them for various reasons. Such reasons might be that the hedge fund performance was just spectacular, or the institutional investor likes the way the particular investment strategy fits within the institution’s allocation design, or the hedge fund manager may have a strong pedigree which appeals to the institutional investor.
Whatever the reason, getting an investment from an institutional investors is usually a longer and more in depth process than receiving money from friends and family or from a high net worth investor. The hedge fund manager will need to first establish a meeting with the institutional investor. Generally the meeting will be at the office of the institution and the manager will have a certain amount of time to give his pitch, usually through a pitchbook presentation. Some managers of the institution will look carefully at these presentations; others will not even open the cover. However, the hedge fund manager should be ready to answer any number of different questions from the institution regarding the program. Such questions will likely cover the following topics: risk management procedures, expected performance in down markets, performance analytics, etc. The hedge fund manager should act composed and answer each question directly and completely – this is the time for the manager to show his knowledge of the investment strategy and sell the strategy to others.
Either before or after the meeting with the institution, the hedge fund manager will likely be asked to complete some basic due diligence. I’ve outlined a sample request in this article: Institutional Hedge Fund Due Diligence. After the institution has interviewed and vetted a manager it may take some time before the institution actually invests in the fund. This happens for a variety of reasons and the hedge fund manager is urged to stay patient during the process.
Legal Implications of Raising Capital for a Hedge Fund
As most hedge fund managers know, under the Regulation D offering rules managers cannot raise capital through any type of general advertising or solicitation. This means that they cannot: buy advertising in any financial publications, advertise generally on the internet (but please see article on Hedge Fund Websites), cold call potential investors and or engage in other similar activities. Additionally, hedge fund managers, and others raising money for hedge funds, must be aware of and abide by all broker-dealer regulations. This is a very important issue, so please discuss it with your hedge fund attorney
Posted 11 months, 1 week ago. Add a comment
Sun Jun 17, 2007 9:00pm EDT
By Saeed Azhar
SINGAPORE (Reuters) – Hedge fund managers around the world have clustered in locations with character, such as leafy Greenwich, Connecticut in the U.S. and the stately Mayfair neighborhood in London.
The latest focal point for hedge funds is Singapore’s picturesque Chinatown, where pastel-colored traditional shop houses, ornate Buddhist temples and Chinese clan houses are within walking distance from the city-state’s financial district.
“Hedge fund managers like to be in a slightly more alternative environment. It’s understandable that if you’ve worked in an investment bank for a long time, you would seek to escape the glass-walled environment,” said Kate Colchester, a director at Singapore-based hedge fund research firm Eurekahedge.
With registered hedge fund assets of about $10 billion according to Eurekahedge, the hedge fund industry in Singapore is smaller than in Hong Kong, which has about $33.5 billion in hedge fund assets, according to official data.
But adding Singapore-registered hedge funds to global hedge fund assets managed here, Merrill Lynch estimates that hedge fund assets managed in Singapore total up to $25 billion and could rise to $100 billion in three years.
While several smaller hedge funds rent space in between the restaurants and tea houses of Telok Ayer Street and Amoy Street, the centre of much of the hedge fund action is One George Street, a gleaming 23-storey office block.
Like One Curzon Street in Mayfair, the building has attracted a string of hedge fund tenants, including Tudor Capital, Man Investments and Alphadyne Asset Management.
One George Street’s proximity to the city’s downtown has also sucked in some of the biggest names in the traditional asset management industry as well, including Fidelity, Legg Mason and Singapore’s leading fund manager Lion Capital.
The latest arrival was Swiss-based RMF, which has $23 billion of hedge fund assets globally.
In January, RMF moved its Asia headquarter to Singapore from Tokyo in January, largely because of the attractive regulatory climate, international environment, and better lifestyle for its employees.
“We made a review of all the major financial centres in Asia and after that Singapore came out at the top,” said Adrian Gmuer, business manager at RMF – which is part of Man Investments.
Last year 102 Asian-focused hedge funds had their decision-making centres in Singapore, compared to 152 in Hong Kong, 122 in Australia, 80 in Tokyo and over 250 in London, Eurekahedge said.
Industry watchers say that low taxes, flexible regulation and a vast pool of money are the main attraction for hedge funds, along with Singapore’s clean air and English-speaking workforce.
DRAWCARD
One major draw is the presence of two big state-backed investment firms; Temasek Holdings and Government of Singapore Investment Corp. (GIC), which manages Singapore’s reserves.
Temasek and the GIC have assets of $84 billion and $100 billion respectively, and many of the fund managers who flock to Singapore compete for the mandates to invest the portion that is placed with independent investment firms.
The GIC, which has 20 percent of its portfolio in hedge funds, private equity, real estate and commodities, may increase its investments in hedge funds and private equity, executives said last year.
Last month, two former executives from Goldman Sachs launched Broad Peak Management, a hedge fund firm with more than $1 billion in assets — including money managed for Temasek, according to industry sources. State-owned Temasek invests in hedge funds through its Fullerton Fund Management unit.
Hedge fund managers say there are several other advantages of being based in Singapore, even for funds which invest in Southeast Asia, Japan or India, including tax breaks, and an attractive legal and regulatory environment.
“From a regulatory perspective, Singapore is actually more flexible as compared to Hong Kong,” said Justin Ong, wealth management specialist at PricewaterhouseCoopers Singapore.
He said that fund managers who meet the Singapore regulatory requirements for exemption from licensing are up and running in two weeks, while “start-ups in Hong Kong need to be registered and licensed with the Hong Kong regulator, including sitting for and passing exams before they can commence operations – which will take them up to three to four months.”
RMF’s Gmuer said the buzz in Singapore reminds him of the time he spent in New York between 2000 and 2003, when the hedge fund industry exploded into the mainstream in the United States.
“At all those cocktail parties in New York, you would bump into all kinds of people from the hedge fund industry. The exact thing is happening here,” he said.
Posted 11 months, 2 weeks ago. Add a comment
Setup a Hedge Fund | Tips from Sykes
Below is an article being added to our Hedge Fund Startup Tools page. This piece is from Tim Sykes, a colorful wall street personality with a large online following and experience in running a small hedge fund and then writing a book on the experience, which I have reviewed here. I do not agree with everything noted below but I believe it is valuable as it is rare to read articles by those who have managed a hedge fund about the struggles of running a small hedge fund.
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I brought an outline of my strategy and performance to a friend of a family friend, who supposedly had access to many hedge fund and rich clients – he was impressed, but wanted to know the details of my strategy but wouldn’t give me any assurances he simply wouldn’t use it for himself. In addition, he wanted my returns audited and only then would he consider helping me raise capital in exchange for a “slight” fee. I couldn’t trust this guy and I didn’t want to tell him my secrets so I passed. This encounter made me realize that audited returns would be necessary because my success was rather unbelievable. I figured this expense would be crucial to my fund raising, so I found a local accountant familiar with stock trading and spent a college semester’s tuition to have my tens of thousands of trades audited.
After a few weeks of patiently reviewing all my trades with this accountant, the audit was finally finished and the numbers looked good. In fact, the numbers looked too good. Yes, my ridiculous returns might be a problem.
Lesson #1:
If you consistently beat the market, you will face endless questions about whether or not you are a fraud.
No matter, I decided to form my own fund and take my chances raising capital. Since I was still in college and had focused solely on trading for the past few years, I had very few business connections and most of my friends and family were not wealthy enough to invest considering the all knowing industry regulations stated my investors would need a net worth of $1 million or more to be worthy of such a “risky investment”. Only my continued performance could attract new money, but, being my cocky self, that was the one part of the equation I wasn’t worried about.
Mutual funds could accept less wealthy investors, but had severe investment limitations. No, I did not want to start a mutual fund because most of them had to be invested at all times and they couldn’t even short sell! Hedge funds were considered the hot new investment vehicle, so I researched the industry nonstop for a few weeks and liked what I saw. I discovered the startup costs to be surprisingly modest and I loved the legal flexibility that would basically allow me to invest in any manner I saw fit.
Before the emergence of discount hedge fund startup shops over the past few years, I found the template for offering documents and lawyer fees could exceed $75,000. Since then, hedge fund boutiques had appeared, offering their administrative and startup services so startup costs did not exceed $10,000. That was some reduction!
I chose the second least expensive boutique I could find (probably something ingrained in me ever since my dad advised to always purchase the second cheapest bottle of wine from a restaurant’s wine list). Still, I was surprised there were so many forms to fill out and small fees to be paid, but I went along with whatever my fund administrator said because he had set up dozens of firms over the past few years. This was the real world so it would take patience, something never required of me in the trading world.
Lesson #2:
Everything takes much more time in the real business world compared to the trading world.
The ink on my letters of incorporation was barely dry when it hit me. I had been distracted by my quest for finding outside investors and creating all my companies that my trading had suffered as a result. Successful trading is all about focus, discipline and concentration and these lessons had been consumed by my ambition and greed. I had taken some rather stupid losses and now, with my fund inception just days away, I would no longer have that magic whole number in front of the millions of dollar under management. No, I would have to put a dreaded decimal point and some other numbers before the word million, hurting my credibility from the start.
Lesson #3:
Focus on trading first; never schedule investor meetings during market hours.
Meanwhile my fund administrator convinced me to switch brokers because my trusty online discount brokerages were simply not used in the hedge fund world. I quickly agreed, but I was in for a rather big surprise. This newly recommended brokerage did not have any electronic trading platform (I was told it would be ready within weeks) and the traders executing my orders gave me some of the worst executions I had ever seen. I called to complain, but they brushed me off. They placated me by saying their new online software was only days away from completion. Almost twenty months later, the software is still almost ready. I switched to yet another recommended brokerage that had online trading software and I became friends with one trader who expertly executed my larger orders.
Still, the commissions I paid were much higher than my previous setup so I asked for and received several price reductions, based on how much trading I did. It quickly became clear which broker I wanted to stay with when the broker without electronic access incredibly upped their commission on a trade without telling me. When I called to complain, the broker told me he knew I was paying more at the other broker and therefore he was entitled to the same rate. He was mistaken on top of the fact that he just had taken matters into his own hands without consulting me. The difference in price on that one trade was only a few dollars, but I lost my temper based on the principle of the situation.
Luckily, I had started chatting regularly with a popular industry commentator and he referred to me another broker that was perfect for short selling. This new broker’s online software, cost, and short-selling list blew away the competition so, I dropped my other brokers and focused on this new guy.
Lesson #4:
Do not feel bad about changing brokers if they are ripping you and your clients off. They are not girlfriends; there is always somebody cheaper and better out there.
The CEO of the brokerage I dropped called me to see what they had done wrong and ask why I had closed my account. I could not understand why it was so important my small fund stayed with their firm that supposedly had billions of dollars in accounts. My commissions with them barely touched into the thousands. As ridiculous as this conversation was, I respected this man for his dedication to providing customer service. Too bad their brokerage services weren’t up to par.
Every fund manager should price as many prime brokers as possible that fit the fund’s strategy. There are many brokers who may trade for themselves, but mainly exist and make money by taking their share out of our online trading commissions. They make their money from trading commissions—that’s the bottom line. There should be no reason to have to pay an individual representative of a major brokerage when we simply use their online software, but that’s the way it is. I am very skeptical when dealing with these people, and I do not feel bad about getting into arguments with them. In fact, I’ve grown to enjoy these fights.
Within a few months with my quality broker, my performance moved back to the range of my previous years, crushing the overall market and my investors were very happy. Yes, my parents and a few of their friends were elated. After months of solid performance that consistently beat the market, I still had yet to raise much outside capital. I realize now that it will take a lot longer than I originally anticipated, but I have made so much money in the past and I am confident in my skill as a trader and that is what gives me the faith to go forward. It doesn’t hurt that I make up a large portion of my fund so I can probably go on forever, however unhappily, even without many outside investors.
Lesson #5:
The larger the ‘nest egg’ stake the manager has, with the initial startup–the better.
When I first started my fund, I moved to New York City because I figured it was the epicenter of the hedge fund industry so I should be able to make thousands of investor contacts. I had met many potential investors and many in this industry, but no matter how many times people said they were interested, no checks were written nor wires sent.
One interesting meeting was with a senior manager of a major mutual fund company who had heard about my performance. I met him at his luxurious house in Florida and we proceeded to discuss my situation. After a few hours of listening to my story, he told me I was very smart and that I should focus on raising capital by changing my strategy around to suit potential investors. He told me in his years of experience, investors would be skeptical of such high returns and would want very low volatility. I told him in my years of outperforming the market I could care less if people accepted my strategy as I believed people will respond to performance. He’s probably right, but I take a certain pride in being a true rebel, a modern-day financial speculator.
Lesson #6:
Focus on what works for you and do not change to accommodate others.
Next, I attended a few alternative investment conferences and handed out plenty of business cards. I was even part of a panel discussion thanks to my fund administrator’s connections, but my speech sounded naïve and unpolished compared to the more experienced managers and veteran marketers in attendance. In fact, I was mesmerized by one particular fund marketer who had grown his fund exponentially over six months. I do not think he said one useful fact during his presentation, but he delivered an eloquent speech and several people, including me, approached him afterwards. Ah, the power of marketing skill. We discussed marketing my fund, but he charged some ridiculous fees without guaranteeing results whatsoever. I was just a startup fund; no matter how great he sounded, I wasn’t going to blow upwards of $10,000 all based on his incredibly polished speech. So, I decided to send out my marketing materials to all potential investors. I contacted just about everyone I knew, but the rate of follow-through was ridiculously minimal.
Lesson #7:
Raising money does not come easily for a startup hedge fund manager.
There are very few reasons for individuals to take a chance on a new operation unless they have known you for years or if your performance warrants the added risk of being invested in a startup. People in large firms will not want to take a chance on your fund because of the minimal track record, lack of transparency of positions, and the volatility of returns. Their job is on the line with any investments they make, and if they mess up—they are fired. For the most part, they would rather underperform than risk losing big. This is what Warren Buffett once called the “institutional imperative.” It is a herd mentality, where these “institutional lemmings” move together, not necessarily doing what is best or smartest for their clients, but what is best and smartest for themselves. The decision to go with a high performing emerging manager is a risky bet, due to the outside chance of looking like a fool. No fund-of-fund manager will make that decision, because they will be fired or scolded if these risky investments don’t go exactly according to plan. Similarly, these emerging managers’ careers are to be ended if they do not make positive yearly performance each year.
My wonderful broker, who I was almost completely satisfied with after months of moving down commissions, recently baited me by saying one of his fund-of-fund clients might be interested in my fund since he was comfortable with my strategy and my performance had been above average. I had heard this many times before, from brokers trying to lure me to changing to their brokerage services to potential investors whose checks always seemed to get lost in the mail. Simple common sense dictates that when a fund-of-fund hears about me–if they are serious, they will contact me, not through my broker.
Full of doubt, I still met my broker and the fund-of-fund manager for lunch so we could discuss a possible investment. Initially, I grew rather excited because the conversation was surprisingly detailed as this manager actually did know about my fund! In fact, his talk of a possible investment sounded rather concrete and the proposed addition would increase my fund assets by 25-50%. We decided to meet again a few weeks later, so I spent hours creating a new presentation tailored to this fund-of-fund’s style. I never got to meet the fund-of-fund manager again, but my broker said he showed him my presentation and he supposedly loved it. The other day, my broker told me the great news. The manager had agreed to invest in my company without even needing to meet me again. Wow! Awesome! Of course, there was a catch. My broker felt horrible telling me (as he claimed), but he could only transfer the funds to me if the commissions on trades for this new investment were quintuple my normal rate! I felt my heart sink. I anticipated compensating my broker for this capital introduction, but quintuple fees with no hope for a reduction over time over the lifetime of the investment seemed somewhat ridiculous. I said no.
Lesson #8:
With capital introduction, there’s always a catch.
My fund is listed on many hedge fund databases, but Hedgeco.net and Hedgefund.net have led to the most information requests by far. After a year of listing my fund, I have had over a thousand hits on my fund’s web pages. In fact, many third party marketers have contacted me through these websites. I have a premium listing on Hedgefund.net that costs the equivalent of a semester of college.
Some third party marketing firms have also contacted me. One marketer said he was showing my PowerPoint presentation to potential investors the day after I emailed him and he would get back to me. Three months later, he has yet to get back to me. Another marketer said he would work for my fund, but wanted 50% of the incentive fee I’d receive on any profits on the investment. Another wanted 30% of the incentive fee. With those kinds of figures, it would take me too long to make it worth my effort even if my returns continued to trample the market. I wanted to pay an upfront finders’ fee to them, but they knew that was not where the big money was. I understood their dilemma; why should they risk their entire reputation on a startup fund with only the chance for a small payoff?
But there was an individual that said he had the connections and was willing to take a job full time with me without taking more than 10% of the incentive fee. I just wanted him to introduce my fund to his connections because I have just a handful of family and friend connections that were wealthy enough to be potential investors. He demanded an exorbitant yearly pay for his services, and would not guarantee he could raise the millions he promised, but he was optimistic after reading my presentation and looking at my returns. I was happy yet skeptical that he did not want to know more about my strategies. It took weeks for him to “write out some contracts” and he insisted I only use his lawyer. Nevertheless, I was optimistic after having talked to him several times. But when I looked at the contracts, I was dismayed.
He wanted to focus on completely overhauling my marketing by creating new expensive presentations. He also tried to sell me on using his buddy as a graphics designer, supposedly the guy who designed the Oakley logo, to design an incredible logo for me that would surely attract investors! I am no marketing genius, but somehow I felt a new logo was not the problem and the Oakley guy was more than a little out of my price range. He also wanted to do a traveling road show to his contacts to present my fund so I could stay put and focus on my trading. Somehow paying for him to jet around the country without me was not my idea of a good investment. I told him no and I designed a simple logo on Microsoft Paint. I still receive many compliments on my simple yet modern logo each week.
Lesson #9:
This industry is full of frauds and con artists.
Are you seeing the pattern here yet? This industry is tough for the little guy because there are many promises and very little follow through. Not being able to advertise is very difficult and you must rely on contacts and networking for capital introductions. You have to be willing to give up your strategy and any chance at tiny yet consistent profits for a shot at the big time. I chose the other path; focus on what I do best and be content to make some decent money while waiting for more opportunities. I figure there will always be people who want to raise money for me and they will only multiply with time, especially if I keep outperforming the market. I do not want to compromise my trading and investing style and I accept the fact that it might take years for investors to come. Only performance and patience will create the path of success—a journey I am willing to take.
Lesson #10:
Results are much slower in the real world compared to the trading world.
Timothy Sykes is a hedge fund manager, star of the reality show Wall Street Warriors, and author of the upcoming book, “An American Hedge Fund” He can be reached at timothysykes.com
Posted 12 months ago. 1 comment
